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Ageing in the Netherlands:
should we trust the 
generational accountant’s
view of the world?
Harry van Dalen*
The fiscal consequences of ageing have been on the
agenda of economists for a considerable time now, and
most of the issues of fiscal policy have also been discussed
at length in the literature and generally  contain few sur-
prises for the informed reader. CPB’s Ageing in the
Netherlands is in that respect no exception: it is one big
generational accounting exercise with no major surprises
that are not already apparent in the work of Bovenberg
and Ter Rele. If you read enough generational accounting
work you know that these calculations are quick-and-dirty,
that they are first approximations and certainly not the
final word on the subject, and I wonder why CPB did not
invest some more time in underpinning the generational
accounts with a dynamic general equilibrium model like
the ones constructed by Peter Broer1and Leon Bettendorf.2
Considering the intellectual background of the authors, I
would have expected a more creative report on ageing,
as there is so much more to say about ageing populations
than this generational accounting exercise suggests. My
role as a discussant is therefore more akin to that of a film
critic who has to write about Jaws III: when you saw and
enjoyed Jaws I (Kotlikoff) you know that Jaws II and Jaws
III will be of less quality and also contain fewer surprises
– no matter how good the reputation of the cast is. The
script demands sharks. In order to change the script of
future ageing studies, I would suggest the following points
of discussion:
1. Why smooth tax rates? The authors use throughout the
paper the assumption of constant tax rates. These con-
stant tax rates can easily be defended on the ground
that government smooths or should smooth tax rates
in order to minimise the deadweight loss associated
with distortionary taxation. What is odd about the use
of the tax rate smoothing assumption is that there is
no reason at all for using this assumption – taxes in the
present set-up have no distortionary consequences, as
the model has no microeconomic underpinnings. Sure,
if you stall raising tax rates now you will have to raise
them more later, but perhaps that may be the efficient
way to go about dealing with ageing populations. I say
‘perhaps’ because you cannot answer this question as
long as you leave preferences undefined. Moreover, as
long as you don’t underpin your policy scenarios micro-
economically, your policy evaluations will be biassed
towards the view shared by generational accountants.
In short, there are no costs, but also no benefits, to keep-
ing the tax rate constant across the generations, so:
why smooth tax rates? (or related: why back off from
general equilibrium modelling?)
2. Why is the sustainable policy solution unique? Anyone
who reads his fair share of Dutch newspapers must be
under the impression that there is only one way to solve
the Dutch budgetary problems and there is only one
optimal debt time path. CPB gives us the same impres-
sion, although they make quite clear why this is so: the
way CPB presents sustainable deficit and debt paths is
so narrow because its definition of sustainability is
equally narrow. The solvency condition necessarily
holds with equality. Otherwise, one leaves tax resources
unused, government spending is left unchanged, and
solving the model for an indirect tax (t) increase is a
simple problem – since there is only one equation with
one unknown: Bf (t) + Bc (t) + D = 0, where Bf (t) repre-
sents the net benefits of future generations, Bc (t) that
of current generations, t is the endogenous tax rate and
D is the initial government debt. One can also see why
taxes need to be constant – not because of the tax
smoothing argument, but simply because the account-
ing framework does not allow any other choice. Any
deviation from this equilibrating tax rate will lead to
exploding debt (or asset) paths. My point with respect
to the uniqueness of this sustainability solution is that
it is an artificial sense of sustainability. Sustainability
is a poorly understood and larger concept than CPB
suggests, and it does not imply some unique time path
of public debt (as presented and readily accepted by
policy makers). As sustainability plays such a large role
in this report, I would therefore have expected a link to
the large literature on testing sustainability of fiscal
policy and using these insights in constructing time
paths. There is an infinite number of sustainable fiscal
policies, making the CPB choice perhaps plausible within
the world of the generational accountant – but outside
that particular world it seems rather arbitrary.
3. Fixed factor prices are a fiction. As the large fluctua-
tions in interest rates in the recent past have shown,
any assumption of constancy is unrealistic in the
medium-term, and certainly in the long run. The idea
that interest rates are fixed is hard to swallow if you
think that the industrialised world is ageing, and this is
bound to have an effect on the world interest rates.
Furthermore, assuming a fixed interest rate does not
necessarily mean that the wage rate is also fixed (p.
18). Of course, predicting the interest rate is almost
an impossible job, but it is better to model this crucial
variable as stochastic and time-varying than to assume
that nothing will happen. 
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4. Government expenditures have no effect, increase in
line with growth, and are apparently provided in an effi-
cient manner. If I understand the authors correctly, gov-
ernment expenditures like infrastructure investment
or education have no real effects on the productivity or
welfare of the Dutch citizens. The authors also assume
that government spending is indexed to the rate of pro-
ductivity growth and although it “doesn’t necessarily
have to be true, it corresponds with long-term empir-
ical evidence. ” My experience is that this unitary income
elasticity does not really show up in the data, but the
authors may of course have different empirical sources
(although they do not mention them explicitly). Last
but not least, government expenditures are left
untouched in the fiscal policy analysis by which authors
implicitly are saying that government spending is done
efficiently and does not need to be scrutinised. This is
odd, as ascertaining the efficient level of government
expenditure goes right to the heart of a discussion about
sustainability in the political arena. CPB has thereby
missed an essential point of the public debate of today.
Wrapping up, Ronald Coase once defended the modest
successes of economists by saying that “An economist
who, by his efforts, is able to postpone by a week a gov-
ernment program which wastes $100 million a year (what
I would consider a modest success) has, by his action,
earned his salary for the whole of his life. ” I hope the
policymakers who take this CPB study seriously will think
for an extra week, because there is more to ageing than
meets the eye, and Ageing in the Netherlands is a report
of a generational accountant. No more, no less.
Notes
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Rotterdam.
we should stress that our primary aim was exactly that:
to provide policymakers with an update of generational
accounting that would be useful both at the national and
international (EU, OECD) level. That does not mean that
– apart from the updating of figures – we just copied ear-
lier exercises. Rather, we improved earlier studies on sev-
eral points. For example, we took more seriously the device
of unchanged policies in assessing future flows of pub-
lic expenditure and tax revenues, and worked through a
detailed sensitivity analysis. Moreover, the CPB study,
more than earlier work, stresses that tax smoothing can
be motivated from considerations of economic efficiency.
Furthermore, the study breaks the link that was forged
in earlier work between the concept of sustainability of
fiscal policies and that of tax smoothing. That our results
then replicate some of the results in earlier exercises may
look surprising, but is pure coincidence.
Too many ‘wonder points’?
Van Dalen stresses the non-uniqueness of policies that
restore the sustainability of public finances. We agree.
Indeed, the intertemporal budget constraint of the gov-
ernment leaves room for immediate action or delay for
any number of years policymakers would find attrac-
tive. It also leaves unspecified whether taxes or public
expenditure (or any combination of the two) should be
used to ensure solvency of the public sector, and which
type of tax or expenditure item should be adjusted.
From this, it follows that tax smoothing is just one of
the many options that can be used to restore the solvency
of the public sector. However, it is a very particular option.
It relates to microeconomic theory that indicates that
the welfare loss from distortionary taxation is quadratic
in the tax rate. Tax smoothing thus appears to be the solu-
tion that invokes the smallest welfare loss.
Van Dalen’s argument that tax smoothing fails to be
attractive in our model because we did not model the dis-
tortionary effects of taxation is not convincing. Tax smooth-
ing is optimal because taxes are distortionary in the real
world, not because they are (not) in our model. Moreover,
we did calculate the additional welfare losses that the
economy would suffer if policies were to deviate from the
prescription of tax smoothing (see pp. 82-83 of the study).
The effects turned out to be very small. We considered
this, actually, to be an intriguing result. At a later stage,
however, we found out that it is not that surprising. Ageing
in the Netherlands is a manageable problem; the neces-
sary adjustment in net primary expenditure to restore sus-
tainability is small, and deviating from tax smoothing
comes at a low price. Somehow, these results are related.
Finally, van Dalen criticises our assumption on public
expenditure. We have taken the view that public expen-
diture may increase in line with GDP . To us, this seems a
rather obvious benchmark assumption that fits in rather
well with historical evidence and the concept of genera-
In reply
Casper van Ewijk and Ed Westerhout (CPB)
Harry van Dalen seems to have had little pleasure in read-
ing the CPB study on ageing. He found that it contained
too few surprises and too many of what he calls ‘won-
der points’. We appreciate the opportunity to respond to
these two comments. Let us explain why.
Too few surprises?
Van Dalen considers the CPB study ‘one big generational
accounting exercise with no major surprises’. In response,46
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tional accounting. But not more than that. We refer to
the sensitivity analysis in the study, which serves to illus-
trate that we can put the best of our knowledge into mak-
ing future projections, but will never succeed in entirely
eliminating forecast errors.
business needs. The incentive is further minimised by the
fact that the commission received on that particular pol-
icy, also has to compensate him for the free advice, such
as a second opinion, that every broker provides. The arti-
cle in review does not recognise this solidarity at all.
Last but not least, reputation effects play a substantial role
in pension advice. Every consumer has the right to ask for
a second opinion, which gives him some insight in the
quality of the advice.
Secondly, the article pleas for a greater product com-
parability. However, improved comparability is extremely
difficult to achieve for the very basic reason that the huge
variety in product characteristics and the extensive tax
legislation are too complex for the average consumer. This
is also the reason that the insight into the quality of advice
will only be limited.
The suggestion to standardise the presentation of the
product characteristics will in itself contribute to an
increased insight into the characteristics. However, stan-
dardisation conflicts with the individuality of both the
insurance company, for whom the way in which they pre-
sent their information is an important marketing tool, and
the consumer, with his or her unique needs; we must there-
fore conclude that striving for standardisation is too ide-
alistic.
Conclusion
De Laat proposes a policy to increase transparency in the
market for third pillar pensions. This contribution shows
that if the need for more transparency in the market for
third pillar pensions should ever arise, then an effective
policy can only be developed with the full co-operation of
all market players. The recent changes in regulation con-
cerning the commissions (WABb), and the self-regulation
with regards to the information provision, are good exam-




In CPB Report 2000/3, Eric de Laat states that in the Dutch
pension system a change in policy in order to stimulate a
switch from the occupational second pillar to the indi-
vidual third pillar, analogous to the introduction of the
Personal Pension in Britain, is not to be recommended
because of the lack of transparency in the market for third
pillar pension provisions. I believe that this conclusion is
too boldly stated and based on a too theoretical point of
view. Therefore, the proposed solutions will be ineffec-
tive.
In this Forum note, I thankfully accept the opportunity
to demonstrate, from a practical point of view, that increas-
ing the transparency is not at all easy. I will begin by com-
menting on the arguments put forward by de Laat. For the
sake of argument, the following facts are disregarded. As
de Laat himself states, “there are no indications that the
lack of transparency currently causes large-scale product
selection errors in the Dutch third pillar. ” Furthermore, he
seems to recognise a tendency towards the build up of
old-age provisions in the third pillar–but provides no basis
for this conclusion. To the contrary, recent tax legislation
stimulates the build-up of old-age provisions in the sec-
ond pillar. Moreover, there is far more need for trans-
parency in the second pillar, and efforts to increase con-
sumers’ insight should at first concentrate on the occu-
pational pension plans.
The first policy measure presented by de Laat is to
change the incentive structure because the advisor has
an incentive not to bring out the best possible advice, due
to the fact that the broker has a direct financial interest
in the consumer decisions – through the commission he
receives. De Laat puts far too much weight on this incen-
tive.
First of all, the commission has to make up for the bro-
ker’s costs, compensate him for his knowledge and war-
rant the continuity of the broker’s firm. So, even if the inter-
mediary gives in to the aforementioned incentive, it will
only be for the part of the commission that exceeds his
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